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Citizenships and sub-citizenships, as a democratic 
outcome, in Latin America
Juan Russo
This research is based on theoretical alternatives of citizenship, which emphasize on the conquest of 
rights (T.H. Marshall) and on the configuration of collective identities (Stein Rokkan). Citizen con-
struction corresponds to long-term historical processes associated with the constitution of the nation-state 
and the consolidation of community identities. Furthermore, its current evolution corresponds to political 
processes and public policies, which have a partway in the democratizations of the mid 80s. The fac-
tors of inequality in the 21st century are presented: poverty and indigence, ethnicity and gender, and the 
results of democratization processes in favor of equality.
Introduction
The constitution of citizenships in Latin America corresponds to long and me-
dium-term sociopolitical orders, as well as the changes and orientations of gov-
ernments regarding the rights of a political community. This set of orders and 
orientations imply distributive social-state matrices of resources allocation, ac-
knowledgment and duties to its members. Regarding long term, matrices can 
be found in Latin America, which configure at least two types of citizenship: 
a) The populist citizenships, which have as a common historical matrix the so-
cio-state model of Industrialization by substitution of imports (ISI model), 
prone to the manipulation of rules and institutions, to have difficulties in 
the development of civil citizenship, as well as to perceive the State as an 
important resource of political action. Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico fall 
in this category. 
b) Republican citizenships, characterized by a great respect to public liberties, a 
conception of the State as a limit to public action and greater development 
of civil citizenship. This category includes countries such as Uruguay, 
Chile, and Costa Rica.
On the other hand (as we will see later), citizenship can be considered ac-
cording to rights as opportunities based on civil, political, and social rights 
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(Marshall 1950) or as a construction of identity and belonging. In the latter 
case, these are predominant citizenships in countries with vast native popula-
tions pre-existing to the State (Bolivia, Peru, Mexico and Guatemala). The 
main tension axis in citizen construction is the recognition of national and 
cultural identity, through the reinstallation of pre-state practices and institu-
tions. In these cases, the advance and construction of citizen rights does not 
only reach with social policies, but with actions of structural change at the 
state level, as it has happened in Bolivia. Two cases: Mexico, the country 
with the largest indigenous population in the region and Brazil, with the larg-
est number of African-descendant people, fall in this category (country with 
rooted citizenship) in an objective way, although, in the case of Mexico, the 
problem of a reform towards a Mexican democracy of consensus and multi-
ethnic inclusion is not on the agenda of the main parties. On the contrary, in 
Mexico little or nothing is discussed about a State reform, and to a large ex-
tent, the problem of original populations is, still, that of a denied civilization 
(Bonfil Batalla 1990); one of the factors that contributes to low participation 
and political disaffection (Russo 2010). 
T.H. Marshall and Stein Rokkan
In the consequent, I will dwell on the citizenship situation considering recent 
data, which emerge in the 21st Century, and which mark important trends for 
the region, also differentiated from other regions of the world. I will analyze 
dimensions related to the development and practice of citizenship and sub-
citizenships in Latin America. In this regard, I find it useful to briefly review 
two classifications of citizenship, one by the English sociologist T.H. Marshall 
(1950) and the other one by the Norwegian scholar Stein Rokkan (2002); cer-
tainly the first one being very famous and the second scarcely spread in Latin 
America. Marshall’s categorization of citizenship is based on the nature of 
rights: civil rights, political rights, and social rights. Civil rights concern free-
dom, property, and security; also involve a great possibility of doing or not 
doing. On the other hand, political rights are fundamentally related to the or-
ganization of demands and political participation; finally, social rights related 
to health protection and opportunities for public education and housing. For 
its part, Rokkan’s citizenship classification is more abstract and is divided into 
two classes: a) rights to roots, that is to say, “the right for the origin community to 
be respected, such as language and ethnic composition”; and b) rights to options, 
that is, “the right to opportunities of full use of individual capacities within a 
broader territorial network” (Rokkan 2002: 230 et seq.). This implies in the 
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first case, the rights associated to a sense of belonging, links, and identities; and 
in the second case, the rights to choose one’s life project taking advantage of 
the context opportunities. For Rokkan, the roots are important because they 
help to know oneself and to know whom we can trust; they constitute the sap 
of cultural identity; and options are also important, which we can choose, be-
cause an actor may want to “go out” to wider scenarios. When these rights, to 
be and to choose, are given in an unbalanced way, various problems occur. If the 
root rights are secured but there is a shortage of options, therefore, difficulties 
to choose, then this can lead to social, cultural, and economic servitude. Con-
versely, when option rights predominate, that is to say, when everything or al-
most everything can be chosen but there is a shortage of rooting; this can lead 
to anomie, irresponsibility, and depersonalization (Rokkan 2002: 230 et seq.). 
In Rokkan, rights work with counterparts of pre-established duties. Thus, 
obligations of tolerance and respect correspond to the rights to roots; while the 
obligations to pay taxes, participate in public affairs, and contribute to the 
community, correspond to the rights to options. The conception of citizenship in 
both scholars differ, in Marshall’s perspective, rights are at the center of the 
evolution of citizenship. On the contrary, in Rokkan’s perspective, political 
systems imply a structure of norms, which link rights-duties and incorporate 
life options along with the system of belonging. On the other hand, for Mar-
shall, citizenship implies political and social positions through the conquest 
of rights, while for Rokkan, citizenship constitutes an essential part of exist-
ence and helps to make sense of it; both scholars also value the spheres of 
citizenship in different ways. For the English sociologist, the zenith of rights is 
achieved with social citizenship as the culmination of civil and political rights; 
while for the Norwegian political scientist, political rights are crucial as they 
empower the actors to acquire other rights. 
Possibly, the political system from which rights are reflected, guides to em-
phasize different dimensions of citizenship. Thus, thinking citizenship from a 
liberal democracy such as the English one, favors considering social citizen-
ship as the zenith, while reflecting from a social democracy such as Norway, 
emphasizes the crucial role of political citizenship. 
In Latin America (unlike the English case), the sequencing between civil, 
political, and social rights does not occur, and social rights are often accom-
panied by manipulation and patronage, instead of involving more agency. In 
the same way (unlike the Norwegian case), political rights such as voting and 
forming political parties (although important instruments) do not guarantee 
the conquest of civil and social rights. 
Largely in Latin America, the main challenge is to achieve civil citizen-
ship, related to the protection of basic freedom inscribed in human rights. 
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Without real rights related to the recognition of roots, the worst defects of 
state institutions built to defend the power and a few people against vulnerable 
communities and actors arise. 
It is important to highlight a structurally diverse situation between Latin 
America and Europe that consists in the relationship between the rights and 
institutional guarantees of citizenship. The citizenship has had, in countries 
such as those of our cited scholars (Great Britain and Norway), solid support 
institutions, fulfillment guarantors of those rights, while in a large part of 
Latin America, the citizen rights are diminished by class factors, regional po-
sition, or pre-existing ascribed benefits. In the same way, institutions guaran-
teeing civil citizenship, such as the courts of justice, in most Latin American 
countries, have serious autonomy and professionalism deficits, in such a way 
that instead of constituting a guarantee of civil rights, they tend to constitute 
a potential threat to citizens. The difference between the quality of guarantors in 
one region and another is not a matter of state extension. As Tilly (1984: 38) 
points out about political rights in Europe: a) Countries with greater state-
hood during the nineteenth century were the first ones to extend the vote and 
did it in a broader way. Even though, on the other hand, b) the rights were 
sustained for a longer time when they had greater guarantees in governments 
with lower statehood. Tilly thinks about political rights insofar as they are 
actors’ claims from society to the State. The relations between political mo-
bilization and the construction of the State lead to the loss or acquisition of 
rights (1984: 40). 
Sub-Citizenships
As I have shown in another site (Russo 2017), sub-citizenships correspond to 
citizenships. This is the practice of diminished rights and, opposite to citizenships; 
it reinforces and legitimizes systems of relative inequality in different spheres 
(economic, social, and politics).  
Citizenship is a system of rights-duties with padlocks that consists of a set of 
commitments between civil society and the State. Padlocks link the vertical 
structures (State), to the horizontal structures (societal), and to the individual struc-
ture. The latter are linked upwards (State) through collective organizations (un-
ions, political parties, civil associations); downwards through the effectiveness 
of standards and sanctions; and inwards (subjective dimension), when there 
are commitments inside the actors, that is to say, in the political community 
members, through control actions, as introjected values by the agents of so-
cialization (family and groups of belonging).
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Social and political organizations may have greater or lesser weight in the 
success of their efforts to reinforce citizenship, and this depends on the sensi-
tivity to be pressured by the base members to carry out certain actions, as well 
as the dependence on those bases. When these organizations get weak, the 
padlocks lose strength and the compromises system between State and society 
loses effectiveness. 
As I mentioned in another site (Russo 2017), sub-citizenship is a type of 
deficit citizenship, which takes place when, 1) recognition comes from only 
one part (the State or the community) and not from the whole political com-
munity. Thus, the citizenship guaranteed by the State, but with recognition 
problems of civil society and perception by the individual of rejection, corre-
sponds to the societal sub-citizenship. Also the citizenship recognized by a com-
munity of peers or actors of civil society, but with deficits of recognition of the 
State, is a statist sub-citizenship.
Through updating that scheme, we can also speak about sub-citizenship 
when the rights of a particular area (rights to roots) or of opportunities (civil, 
social, and political rights) are not recognized or fully exercised. This can be 
illustrated as follows:
Sub-citizenships
a. Of roots (null or little recognition by the State and society, rights [civil, po-
litical, and social, as well as recognition) caused by their cultural identity],
a.1. State-owned of origin [null or little recognition by the State, of rights 
(civil, political, and social, as well as recognition) caused by their cul-
tural identity];
a.2. Societal of origin [null or little recognition by the State and society, of 
rights (civil, political, and social, as well as recognition) caused by their 
cultural identity].
b. Of opportunities (defective or null exercise of civil, political, and social rights).
The sub-citizenships of origin are mainly developed in Latin American 
countries, where there are ethnic majorities that were colonized (Bolivia, 
Perù, Ecuador, Paraguay, Brazil, Guatemala, and Mexico); also, in regional 
minorities (northern region of Argentina, Chile, and Colombia), or minorities 
of gender (women, LGTB) and migrants.
In the cases when the sub-citizenship is both, state and societal, and it 
affects an area of rights, I will simply refer to sub-citizenship of origin or civil sub-
citizenship, etc.
When the sub-citizenship includes the set of political, social, and civil 
rights, I will talk about the sub-citizenship of opportunities; and in the case when it 
SOCIETÀMUTAMENTOPOLITICA48
affects the set of rights by the State and society, I will talk about sub-citizenship, 
tout court.
In any case, the sub-citizenship is experienced as discrimination by indi-
viduals; an example of the societal sub-citizenship (of rights) of origin is the one of 
young Afro-descendant people in France, who in 2015, produced a car-burn-
ing movement as a rebellious action due to the lack of social and subjective 
integration, despite having guarantees from the State of equal legal treatment 
and having good jobs. That is, their civil, social, and political rights were 
given by the State, but at the level of society they felt rejected, mainly because 
of their ethnic identity.
On the other hand, an example of statist sub-citizenship (of rights) of origin, is 
the one of the Mesoamerican communities in Guatemala or Mexico, where 
the State does not make an effective treatment of equality before the com-
munities law, but this recognition comes from the communities themselves. 
In this last example, the sub-citizenship (statist and societal) of origin, causes sub-
citizenship of opportunities in general terms. It is not by chance that the poorest 
populations in Mexico and Guatemala are populations of Mesoamerican ori-
gin, nor that they have a high social and legal vulnerability.
In some Latin American regions there are sub-citizenship of roots, which 
are translated into the intolerance and contempt of the State towards com-
munities with history and diverse identities to the dominant ones, according 
to the miscegenation paradigm.
Sub-citizenships of Origin
Currently, in the region there are more than eight hundred indigenous peoples 
recognized by the States, with a population of around fifty million, to which, 
about one hundred twenty-five million Afro-descendants must be added; most 
of them living in Brazil (Cepal, 2016). Five countries, add together, almost 
90% of the regional indigenous population: Perù (27%), Mexico (26%), Gua-
temala (15%), Bolivia (12%), and Ecuador (8%). The Afro-descendant popu-
lation (Afro-Latin and Afro-Caribbean) reaches 150 million people, which 
means around 30% of the total population of the region, located predomi-
nantly in Brazil (50%), Colombia (20%), and Venezuela (10%). The discrimi-
nation situations are not exclusive to the original populations from America 
and Africa, but the reasons for this type of discrimination in Latin America 
affect rights linked to identity and people’s origin.
Despite the reduction of poverty and indigence since the beginning of 
2000, [it went from 43.9% in 2002 to 28.2% of poor people in 2014, and from 
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19.3% to 11.8% of indigents (CEPAL 2016: 30)], today both scourges affect 
168 million people in poverty and seventy million in indigence. How much 
do these figures imply and hide a culture of discrimination? Is tolerance for 
poverty in Latin America part of ethnic discrimination? The highest poverty 
and indigence levels correspond to indigenous and Afro-descendant popu-
lations. At the same time, discrimination also operates within each group, 
with women from each ethnic group being the most affected. Comparing 
the number of poor people with sub-citizenship of origin regarding the general 
population, it is observed that “the population in situation of indigence and 
poverty is significantly higher among the indigenous ... of around 30 per-
centage points in Brazil and Paraguay... At the same time, the poverty rate 
among indigenous people is equal or higher than 50% in Guatemala, Mexico, 
and Paraguay; close to 40% in Bolivia (Plurinational State of ), Brazil, and 
Ecuador; and 26% in Perù. Only in Chile and Uruguay, the percentages of 
indigenous poverty are equal or lower than 10%” (ECLAC 2016: 32). Figure 
1 shows the cases of Afro-descendant people and the poverty rate compared 
to the non-afro-descendant poor population.














These data concerning sub-citizenship of origin are consistent with the com-
position of the lower income concentrate. A massive presence of people of 
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indigenous or Afro-descendant origin can be observed in the first income 
quintile, this stands out when it is compared to the population in general. This 
contrast shows that the population distribution, by income quintiles, is also 
marked by the ethnic and racial condition of people: «considering the propor-
tion of Afro-descendant people, of these populations in the first quintile (34%), 
it is significantly higher than the proportion of the non-Afro-descendant or 
non-indigenous population (19%) in that condition. In the fifth quintile (of 
higher income), the situation is the opposite: there is 10% of Afro-descend-
ant people and 20% of non-Afro-descendants and non-indigenous people» 
(ECLAC 2013: 32).
Moreover, in terms of perceived discrimination (victimization of discrimi-
nation), the figures are high in the countries with the highest percentages of 
indigenous populations and with an Afro-descendant population, as it can be 
seen in figure 2.




































It is even higher in those cases, when the population witnessed discrimina-
tory acts (figure 3), perhaps more real figures, if one takes into account that 
many interviewees prefer to present their case as the one of a third person.
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The experiences of discrimination in eight countries with original popula-
tions and Afro-descendant people in America show high levels of intolerance, 
which give an objective and subjective nature to sub-citizenships, which rein-
force and consolidate the internal walls of society itself. Different nations, rec-
ognized in a new state (in the case of Bolivia), denied (in the case of Mexico), 
with historical attempts to exterminate their population by the government 
itself (in the case of Guatemala), are erected and maintained in different parts 
of Latin America. The sub-citizenships of origin affect the recognition, the 
identity of peoples, and the native populations integrity from America and 
Afro-descendants. Furthermore, the sub-citizenship of origin reaches women, 
although, it should be noted that with respect to other groups (original popu-
lations), there has been a more positive evolution, much faster and sustained. 
Thus, in Latin America and the Caribbean, the employment rate reached 
45.5%, even though it is still lower than the one of men (67%) (ILO, 2018). In 
the same way, the quality of conditions regarding the female work is inferior 
to the male one, which implies inequities in the remuneration and recognition 
of the work done (ILO, ECLAC, FAO, UNDP, UN Women 2013). The “silent 
revolution” of women still finds pockets of stagnation and aggravation of in-
equalities, as it can be seen in the fact that it continues to be the most affected 
sector of the indigenous and Afro-descendant populations.
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Sub-citizenships of Opportunities
The concept of citizenship is important, insofar as, it constitutes a factor in 
favor of the equality of people. It is the opposite force to the process of inequal-
ity caused by social class (Marshall 1957), or by cultural (ethnic, of gender) 
discrimination. In the 1980s, the region began a process of unprecedented 
democratization, leaving behind the historical inertia of dictatorships or the 
instability of the political regime, which until then had characterized much 
of the 20th century. How much has citizenship advanced in Latin America 
overcoming the deep-rooted situations of sub-citizenship (Russo 2017)? How 
much democratization progress in the region, initiated in the 80s and which 
led to a positive construction in terms of political rights, implied the consti-
tution of an egalitarian society (Rokkan hypothesis)? How much the force 
of equality was caused by social policies (Marshall hypothesis)? The answer 
lies in the joint advance of political and social rights. As it can be seen in the 
following table, the evolution of poverty and indigence has varied since the 
arrival of democracy.
Figure 4. Evolution of poverty/indigence 1980-2015
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The existence of democracy by itself and political rights is not achievable 
to improve social rights: this is shown by the transition from the 80s to the 90s, 
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where the vulnerable population increased from 40 to 48%. The first years of 
democracy, despite the advances in political rights, coincided with the world 
record of inequality in Latin America. The evolution of social rights was as-
sociated with specific public policies that have reinforced social citizenship. 
Therefore, the 90s, with a predominance of liberal policies, were accompa-
nied by a consolidation of the poor population, while the compensatory poli-
cies from the middle of the new century first decade implied an improvement 
in the poverty and indigence figures. At the same time, it is clear that without 
political rights and access to the positions of alternative political groups and 
parties, changes in the public policies orientation would have been achieved. 
Finally, it is not appropriate to measure the impact of political rights in a 
short period of time. These are rights that imply the possibility of overcoming 
thresholds (Rokkan 1982), that after the medium and long terms, they will 
have an impact on the development of social rights.  

















































































































































«Between 2002 and 2012, the average participation of the first quintile in 
the total income went from 4.8% to 6.2%, while the one of the fifth quintile 
decreased from 50.7% to 45.0%. Consequently, the participation of the high-
est income quintile went from 10.7 times higher than the one of the lowest 
income quintile, to 7.2 times. Even though, slightly, the tendency to reduce 
inequality continued between 2012 and 2016. In 2016, the quotient between 
the participation of the fifth quintile (44.2%) and the first quintile (6.5%) was 
6, 8 times (see figure I.2)» (ECLAC 2017: 43). 
SOCIETÀMUTAMENTOPOLITICA54
How much does the right / left ideological sign count in the inequality 
decrease?
From 2002 to 2016, the behavior of inequality decrease is a regional fact 
that covers different countries regardless of their ideological sign. However, in 
those countries with left and center-left governments, the decrease has been 
greater. For example in Bolivia, Venezuela, Argentina, Ecuador, and Brazil, 
this is observable. Even when there are national tendencies of State policies 
(Chile and Argentina), where the left / right alternation did not diminish the 
tendency to lower inequality, or of “inertias” of equality / inequality in each 
country, which is also explanatory: the case of Argentina (with Kirchner / 
Macri alternation).
The weak glue: Unreliability 
Sub-citizenships such as the diminished exercise or the denial of rights pro-
duce a social fabric of distrust and political disaffection. This is partly ex-
plained by the “tunnel effect” discovered by Albert Hirschman (1984, chap-
ters 3, 4, and 5). When economically or socially disadvantaged groups observe 
that the elites welfare will also be their own welfare, then, the support for the 
cultural and political system grows. On the contrary, when the elites welfare 
grows rapidly, while the bases are in the same position, the citizenship be-
comes detached and the sense of community is lost. This is congruent with 
the effect that corruption seems to have on political disaffection and distrust. 
A lubricant of the citizenship development is interpersonal trust. Security 
problems and the growth of victimization rates in the region have impacted 
on a decrease in reliability. This is relevant because if the population fears 
instead of respecting, the police, or distrusts instead of trusting, the arbiters of 
justice, then citizenship is seriously affected (Portantiero 2000: 180). On the 
other hand, the reliability between the others implies a “bona fide” recogni-
tion (Fukuyama 1995) of the society towards the person. According to Latin-
barometer (Latinobarómetro), in 2016 «interpersonal reliability remains the 
same as last year in one of its lowest points in the entire series with 17%» 
average. That is, more than 8 out of 10 people do not trust “the other one”, in 
Latin America. It amazes that a country with high traditional levels of unre-
liability (such as Mexico and Argentina), currently appears with the highest 
levels of relative reliability in the region (30 and 25% respectively). In these 
countries, reliability is limited and covers a minority radius of people. Thus, 
in terms not related to the region, the majority (7 people out of 10 in Mexico, 
and more than 7 in Argentina), do not fully trust their neighbors. Brazil is the 
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extreme case (3%of reliability): that is to say, it is a country emptied of inter-
personal trust. This is attributable, in part, to corruption scandals and the 
political crisis, which affects society as a whole.” The vertical reliability, this 
is, from the citizens towards the institutions is not encouraging either: only the 
Catholic Church has confidence levels that exceed 50% (69%). The State is 
strongly questioned. Thus, out of 10 Latin Americans, more than half of them 
do not trust the Armed Forces (56%), 7 do not trust the police (67%), nor the 
Justice Department (70%), nor the Congress, and 8 of 10 people do not trust 
political parties (Latinobarómetro 2016: 33).
The tunnel effect manifests itself in the perception of what the object is, 
of politics for politicians. Politicians are not perceived following the common 
benefit, but on the contrary, they are perceived behind their particular in-
terests: «In Brazil, Paraguay, and Chile only 9% to 10% of the population 
believe in a government for all the people; while in Nicaragua, Bolivia, and 
Ecuador, the three countries where the government for all the people is mostly 
believed, this perception reaches 46%, 40%, and 35%, respectively. In 2016, 
a maximum of 73% of regional citizens, who believe that it is governed for the 
benefit of a few powerful groups, is reached. Percentages in other countries 
reached 88% in Paraguay, 87% in Brazil and Chile, 86% in Costa Rica, 84% 
in Perù, 82% in Colombia, and 80% in Panama. Therefore, in 7 countries of 
the region, 80% or more of the population believe the same; that is, they are 
societies, which feel deeply disappointed with the results of democracy and its 
performance» (Latinobarómetro 2016: 33).
The justification for not paying taxes is considered as citizen defection. 
Therefore, in 2016 «the countries with the highest social justification for tax 
evasion are Guatemala, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico; 
evasion is least justified in Argentina and Chile. Corruption and the weak-
ness of governments (lower levels of approval) are some of the factors that 
explain this behavior, as well as the massive criticism to the quality of Poli-
tics» (2016: 67).
Regarding tolerance to corruption, that is, a problem that can be compen-
sated by the effectiveness of government, the most tolerant countries are those 
of Central America and the Caribbean; while in the southern cone (Brazil, 
Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile) and the Andean countries (Perù, and Bolivia) 
have lower levels of tolerance. In accordance with the above, the Americas 
Barometer reports «citizens of the Americas are more concerned, today, with 
crime and violence than what they were a decade ago» (Report 2014: 3). How 
much does this affect political participation? How much do Latin Americans 
participate? This point is shown below. 
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Political Participation
Political participation is a relevant dimension when, from the actions, strate-
gies, and rules, the actors, without relevant origin positions, have the pos-
sibility of influencing the course of public events, including the occupation of 
vertex positions. On the contrary, if political positions derive from conditions 
outside participation, then it declines or disappears. In this tenor, Alessan-
dro Pizzorno (1966) has pointed out that the participation problem appears 
only at the moment when popular sovereignty emerges. Participation then be-
comes a significant political phenomenon when such automatic correspond-
ence between conditions and political position ceases. For participation to be 
a relevant piece of information in any political system, it is required that: 
a. There is no automatic correspondence between the political position and 
external conditions beyond the participation of the community members,
b. Any position (social, economic, political, or cultural) is not a sufficient con-
dition for accessing political positions,
c. Any political position requires, at least partially, the action of the actors, 
regardless of their previous positions.
That is, participation acquires meaning when influence depends on the 
decision-making process. Political participation is, besides, important for two 
reasons: a) political mobility, in other words, citizens can, starting from below, 
ascend to government positions or representation through their participation; 
b) the influence of citizens on decision makers, through their action. Therefore, a 
system with scarce participation, theoretically, has a negative impact on the 
accountability of rulers, as well as on political equality. However, do citizens 
participate in democracies? Do they participate in Latin America?
Although electoral participation is only one of the possible participation 
modalities, in democratic regimes its consequences are immediate and sig-
nificant. Furthermore, in democracy, electoral participation is always present 
when other forms of participation are relatively infrequent.
In Table 1, there are clearly three groups of countries with different av-
erage participation thresholds and inertias: firstly, those participatory countries, 
which surpass the 70% threshold (Uruguay, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Bolivia, 
Argentina, and Panama); secondly, the countries with medium participation, 
with a threshold of more than 60% (Venezuela, El Salvador, Dominican Re-
public, Mexico, Costa Rica, Chile, and Honduras); and finally, the countries 
with little participation and with a threshold of less than 50% (Paraguay, 
Colombia, and Guatemala). The countries electoral behavior in the region 
during the first decade of the 21st century has been relatively stable. Thereby, 
the countries of the extremes are kept at the same threshold: participatory 
(with the exception of Bolivia that has increased and Panama that decreased 
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electoral participation) and with less participation (except Guatemala, with a 
participation increase in the last election). Conversely, the intermediate coun-
tries have higher instability. They stand out in terms of declining participa-
tion, Chile and Honduras. What factors contribute to this vote distribution in 
the region? A factor is usually the confidence in being able to modify politi-
cal situations through voting. But this is not clear, based on opinion studies 
from the Latinobarómetro (2008, 2009, 2010), where the distribution of these 
opinions is not consistent with the electoral behavior. Additionally, the politi-
cal tradition influences as well as the conjunctures of disenchantment or, on 
the contrary, to see political options perceived as a true change. However, 
these generalizations may result being over abstract in the light of history. 
The evolution of electoral participation in each country and in the region may 
follow a homogeneous course, or on the contrary, follow a divergent course 
of unconventional participation. Regarding conventional participation, Chile 
has recently become one of the countries with the lowest electoral participa-
tion (it reached its lowest point in the 2016 municipal elections with 34% of 
participation). It is alarming if we take into consideration that only a little over 
Table. 1. Electoral participation in presidential elections
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average
Uruguay 91 96 93
Ecuador 70 84 90 81
Peru 76 78 83 86 81
Brazil 79 84 77 80
Bolivia 67 63 86 72
Argentina 77 72 77 75
Panama 80 69 75
Venezuela 47 76 61
El Salvador 63 72 68
Dominican R. 65 69 72 70 69
Mexico 60 63 65 63
Costa Rica 59 64 62 62
Chile 72 63 59 65
Honduras 72 61 53 62
Paraguay 48 46 47
Colombia 45 44 45 45
Guatemala 42 45 61 49
Source: Political citizenship, (2014) PNUD,  Idea Report.
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a decade ago, more than 80% of the electoral registration voted. This varia-
tion can be hardly explained only by the change in the compulsory nature of 
the vote in 2012, although from that year the decline began. In 2012, we can 
observe that less than 2% of Chileans participated in political campaigns. 
Conversely, countries such as Brazil, Paraguay, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica 
transcend the 10% of participation. However, when the level of participation 
outside the political representation is analyzed, for example in protests, Chile 
occupies the first positions with 11% of people who have participated. A plau-
sible hypothesis, particularly if the difficulties of modifying fundamental rules 
are taken into account, this may indicate a level of disagreement with aspects 
related to the political order itself. Another contrasting case is Bolivia, which 
leads the participation in protests, and at the same time it is the country that 
presents lower levels in persuading others along the electoral campaign. On 
the contrary, there are countries with greater congruence in the types of par-
ticipation. Thus, Mexico shows really low levels in any type of participation, 
both, in the electoral processes and in the protests. The case of Haiti is high in 
both (participation in protests and in the electoral process). This can perhaps 
be explained by the confidence of the citizens in the possibility of being able 
to modify the political circumstances, extremely low confidence in Mexico 
and high in Haiti.
There are notable differences in democratic regimes regarding electoral 
participation rates. The explanation of this difference is systemic, that is, it 
depends on the political and institutional characteristics of each political sys-
tem. At parity of political and institutional order, the greater or lesser inclina-
tion of the individuals to vote may be due to psychological orientations and 
socioeconomic conditions. A person is more likely to vote if there are three 
cognitive conditions: in general, the person a. is interested in voting; b. pos-
sesses political information; and c. has a sense of effectiveness. These cogni-
tive conditions work best in alliance with certain objective conditions such as 
socioeconomic status (Milbrath 1965, Milbrath and Goel 1977). According to 
Milbrath, those “central” actors of society participate more. In this central case, 
it is to be trained, to come from the middle class, to be a man, to belong to the 
intermediate cohorts of age, to be married, to be a citizen, to be a resident, to 
belong to the majority ethnic group, and be a member of associations. The 
higher the socioeconomic status of an individual is, the more likely it is for the 
individual to participate. However, as the Italian sociologist Alessandro Piz-
zorno (1966) points out: that which favors participation is not the centrality in abstract or 
in general, pointed out by Milbrath, but the centrality with respect to a social group. Political 
participation is an action in solidarity with others, which aims to preserve or 
transform the structure (and values) of the system of dominant interests.
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We can consider two types of political participation: the one of representa-
tion support, and the one of criticism to political representation. Regarding 
the first one, electoral participation and participation in the electoral process 
(in the campaign and in convincing others about the vote) is included. In the 
second type of participation, protests are counted outside state institutions. 
Participation in elections is important in any democracy. Democracy has 
among its challenges, the recognition, with actions and policies, of its great 
cultural diversity; to vote is to reaffirm the idea of nation. Latin Americans have 
very diverse traditions of electoral participation. There is no subregional pat-
tern. Thus, southern cone countries such as Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina 
have high electoral participatory traditions; but Paraguay, on the other hand, 
has one of the lowest participatory traditions in the region; Chile, in the last 
decade has had a pronounced descent; and the Andean countries (Ecuador, 
Perù, and Bolivia in recent years) are also participatory.






























































































Political participation consists of people’s commitment to the political sys-
tem, at different levels, from total disinterestedness to occupying a position in 
a public office [Rush 1992]; and more precisely, it consists of the set of citizens’ 
behavior oriented to influence the political process [Axford, Rosamond 1997]. 
Political participation can be classified into two types: a) visible political partici-
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pation, that is, the set of actions and behaviors that aim to influence somehow 
directly, and somehow legally, in decisions. Among them, the selection itself of 
the power holders in the political system, or in simple political organizations, 
with the intention of preserving or modifying the structure (and then the values) 
of the dominant interests system. Literature in the field of power has made evi-
dent that influence can also take place even in the absence of actions (Bachrach 
and Baratz 1962), through the so-called predicted reactions (Lukes 1974, 2005).


































There has been a discussion about b) “latent” participation, that is to say, po-
tential participation and, to a certain extent, effective participation, when there 
is a political community interested in politics and informed about its dynamics. 
This is rarely activated and in a discontinuous way, but with the capacity to 
participate. In this regard, visible political participation is low in Latin Amer-
ica, but how much is it latent participation? The answer is clear: potentially, 
becoming a structural fact reinforces low participation. How much electoral 
participation is compensated by dynamics of non-electoral participation? As it 
can be seen in figure 8, participation at the municipal level is low, particularly if 
attending meetings in the municipality is considered. The same occurs when a 
greater commitment is measured (figure 9), Chile appears in the extremes (in a 
congruent way with electoral participation (4.1%) and Haiti (21.2%). 
Participation does not depend on trust to the municipal government. On 
the contrary, for example, Haiti is one of the countries with the least munici-
pal reliability and Chile, on the other hand, one with a high level of confi-
dence and low participation. 
61CITIZENSHIPS AND SUB-CITIZENSHIPS IN LATIN AMERICA




























































































































It is also important to pay attention to participation as a community leader, 
this is, the protagonist participation that is not individual, such as voting, but 
involves forming groups and participating into group activities. As it can be 
seen in the following figure, it is a type of participation, which takes place in 
countries with a greater proportion of pre-Hispanic indigenous populations, 
where cultures of greater community citizenship take place. 
Figure 10. Participation as a community leader
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In this regard, it is convenient to review the compared literature to appre-
ciate that scarce participation is not only a fairly widespread phenomenon in 
many countries, but that it dates from quite a long time in some of them. The 
theory of a participatory political community has been largely refuted by the 
facts in fully consolidated and fairly stable democracies. In addition, this dis-
crepancy was raised in terms of, whether “extensive participation” is actually 
an indicator of good democracy, or not. This classical question arose already 
in the 60s, when the coexistence of advanced democracies, developed econo-
mies, and extremely low political participation was noticed. A highly relevant 
comparative research was carried out by Almond and Verba, published in 
1963. The famous comparison between the United States, England, Mexico, 
Germany, and Italy yielded results that challenged the normative premise 
of highly participatory and informed citizens, as well as democracy stability. 
The researchers pointed out that, actually, research “about political behavior 
doubts this activist and rational model, since it is evident that citizens of dem-
ocratic systems do not respond, but rarely to this model. They are not well 
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informed, nor deeply engaged, nor particularly active “(Almond and Verba 
1963: 383). At the same time (1965), another famous investigation, confirmed 
the conclusions of Almond and Verba. I refer to Milbrath, who verified that in 
the United States, the “gladiators”, an actor with a high level of political par-
ticipation (measured with indicators such as contacting a politician, giving an 
economic contribution to a party or a candidate, participating in a political 
meeting, granting time for a political campaign, becoming an active member 
of a party, participating in important political meetings, requesting funds for 
political objectives, and being elected to a political office), barely reached 7% 
of all citizens, while the sum of the “spectators”, characterized by a minimum 
commitment reached 60%, and apathetic 30%. That is, in total, the non-
participatory reached 90% of the political community. In 1978, Verba and 
Nie, specifying levels of participation, confirmed the data, becoming a solid 
tendency towards low participation. Voters (those who only vote) reach 21%, 
while those interested in broad public issues reach 18%. Fifteen years after the 
publication of Almond and Verba’s work, Lagroye (1993) would observe that 
the distance between the norm of participation and effective participation was 
still very large. Does Latin America follow the trend towards participation in 
unconventional ways? 
















































































Political participation has changed from orthodox forms such as voting, 
joining a party, joining a union, organizing a meeting, and signing to par-
ticipate in a referendum; to modern and heterodox forms such as campaign-
ing for abstention or blank vote, participating in a movement, carrying out 
wild strikes, blocking traffic, doing sit-ins sittings, boycotting a supermarket, 
and damaging material goods. An important work carried out in the sec-
ond half of the 70s, revealed, “in advanced industrial societies, direct action 
techniques contain the stigma of deviation, and are not seen as antisystem 
either.” (Barnes et al. 1979: 162). In countries such as England, Germany or 
the United States, the percentage of the population willing to participate un-
conventionally facing situations generated by unfair rules has increased seven 
times, over a period of almost 15 years (between 1960 and 1974). Has this 
happened in Latin America? Now, we can clarify this point: an investigation 
carried out on Western Europe (Topf 1995), has shown that unconventional 
participation has increased enormously to the point of talking about a par-
ticipatory revolution. Therefore, the inactive ones have decreased (from 85% 
in 1959, to 44% in 1990) and a parallel growth of people with a certain type 
of political activity (from 15% in 1959 to 66% in 1990). Citizens entered the 
2000s very distant from political parties, critics to elites and institutions, and 
less positively oriented towards governments (Dalton 2004). 
In order to clarify, we can recall, the question, what are the types of par-
ticipation according to an important research [Barnes et.al. 1979]. If the 
range of behaviors that we will call political participation is extended, then 
five kinds of behavior can be considered. On one side, a) the conformists, who as 
its name suggests, are actors engaged in conventional forms of participation; 
b) the reformers: who participate in a conventional way exploring the borders 
of the legal forms of protest, but staying within the limits of that legality; c) 
the activists, who use all legal forms, touch and cross borders until they adopt 
non-legal modes of response; d) the inactive, who go from the total absence of 
political interest to information or at most, to signing a petition; and e) the 
protestants, who are willing and adopt all unconventional forms, but also reject 
conventional forms of participation. Therefore, our questioning is whether in 
Latin America, actors with alternative forms of participation, such as those 
mentioned above, predominate. In Latin America, a larger percentage, in 
general, of the population, which can be observed approving street marches 
and protests in all countries with the exception of Mexico, where more than 
50% of the population rejects them. This northern country, generally, has a 
high level of unreliability in participation, as the rates of formal and informal 
participation have shown.
How many people participate or have participated in protests?
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The participation rate is low, even in those countries where the protests 
have been approve in high percentages, such as Brazil and Uruguay, and as 
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it is observed in figure 13, it has gradually decreased from the last decade to 
today. 
In some countries, the figures are more consistent (relatively high partici-
pation and approval of protests) such as Chile or Peru; or (relatively low par-
ticipation and disapproval of protests) such as Mexico. Public participation 
as a protest is far today in Latin America of 66%, mentioned by Topf (1995). 
Conclusions 
How much has Latin America advanced in citizen rights and in terms of rep-
resentative quality in the last decades? It has been noted, for a long time, that 
it constitutes the most violent region as well as one of the most unequal over 
the planet. In terms of social citizenship, poverty has decreased from 48.3% 
to 33.2% between 1990 and 2008 (ECLAC 2009). However, sub-citizenships 
continue to be a reality and five of the ten most unequal countries in the 
world are in the region; among them, the most economically powerful (Bra-
zil). In terms of security, 27% of the world’s homicides are committed in the 
region, which has 10 of the 20 countries with the highest homicide rates in the 
world (Dammert ,2012). At the same time, in recent decades, a profound and 
unprecedented process of political change has taken place, oriented towards 
democratization and towards the evolution of new citizen forms. Naturally, 
there is a diversity of internal processes that make it difficult to talk about 
the same regional reality. Countries such as Haiti and Uruguay are part of 
very different histories, however, Latin America is a region with common 
historical trajectories in the long term, a geopolitical reality regarding domi-
nant powers, and also in more recent times, a set of shared experiences. In the 
last 70 years, Latin America was urbanized, educated, and modernized; the 
family structure was modified, new technologies reached the whole region, 
even with internal disparities (Delich, 2004). All this has resulted, as shown 
by cross-national cultural studies, in the consolidation of a core of common 
values in the region (Inglehart, Carballo, 2008). Since the 1980s, democrati-
zation has been experienced, with contradictory and sometimes paradoxical 
effects for the development of citizenship. The fate of citizen evolution is tied 
to the development of democracies. Countries such as Mexico, with difficul-
ties to achieve the alternation of political block (right / left), have found at the 
time of their electoral institutions improvement and political competition with 
the historic alternation of the year 2000, obstacles that set democracy at stake. 
They imply citizen regressions unthinkable only 15 years ago. The countries 
that have gone through the center-left populist experiences, such as Ecuador 
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and Argentina, have been able to process the political block transition with-
out major problems. In Argentina, the eve of overcoming a crucial problem 
such as that a non-Peronist government succeeds in completing an alternating 
process.  In the meanwhile, Bolivia, still fails to overcome (as Ecuador did) the 
dilemma of succession, to consolidate a different mode of political construc-
tion and State. Countries that have gone through gradualist experiences and 
better-combined alternation with institutional solidity, such as Uruguay and 
Chile find, in the first case, an important advance in citizenship indicators 
(civil, political, and social). In Chile, the democratization with solid vestiges of 
change impotence to the inherited Pinochet order, disenchant the Chileans, 
to the point where it has today one of the lowest voter participation rates. It is 
clear that the scale and quality of the problems facing the processes of citizen 
construction are disparate and follow national inertias: there are countries 
where public policies are central to the development of citizenship. In par-
ticular, those cases where the citizenship of opportunities is predominant, such 
as Argentina or Uruguay; others where state reform is required to empower 
large (and at the same time marginalized) sectors of the population: Mexico 
or Guatemala. The 21st century shows that with respect to citizenship, de-
mocracy did not come in vain (it is far from the systematic violations of hu-
man rights implied by state terrorism), but at the same time, the challenges 
arising can imply new abysses if problems are not diagnosed with courage and 
reinvented to achieve better citizens with the horizon of the best traditions.
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